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3, 5,

JURISDICTION IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to§ 78-2a-3, Utah
Code Ann. (1996).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
-ISSVENCM
In light of the defendant's lack of notice of the trial setting, was it proper for the trial
court to deny defendant's motion to be relievedfromthe July 7,1997 judgment? This issue was
raised in plaintiffs Motion for Relief from Decree filed September 18,1997.
Standard of Review
A denial of a motion to vacate a judgment under Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure is ordinarily reversed only for an abuse of discretion. Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92, 93
(Utah 1996); Russell v. MartelL 681 P.2d 1193, 1994 (Utah 1984); Baker v. Western Sur. Co..
757 P.2d 878, 881 (Utah App. 1988).
ISSUE NO. 2
In light of the procedural errors of defendant's former counsel, plaintiffs counsel, and the
trial court, was it proper for the trial court to deny defendant's motion to be relieved from the
July 7,1997 judgment? This issue was raised in plaintiffs Motion for Relief from Decree, filed
September 18,1997, and Motion to Reconsider, filed December 29, 1997.
Standard of Review
A denial of a motion to vacate a judgment under Rule 60(b) is ordinarily reversed only
for an abuse of discretion. Katz v. Pierce. 732 P.2d 92, 93 (Utah 1996); Russell v. MartelL 681
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P.2d 1193,1994 (Utah 1984); Baker v. Western Sur. Co.. 757 P.2d 878, 881 (Utah App. 1988).
Whether the proper procedures were followed is a question of law and is reviewed for
correctness. Hartford Leasing Corp. v. Utah. 888 P.2d 694 (Utah App. 19941 Since this claim
presents a question of law, it is reviewed under a correction of error standard, giving no

,

particular deference to the trial court's determination. See Ames v. Maas. 846 P.2d 468, 471
(Utah App. 1993); Holm v. Smilowitz. 840 P.2d 157, 160 (Utah App. 1992).
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES
Section 78-51-36. Utah Code Ann, (1996)
When an attorney dies or is removed or suspended, or ceases to act as such, a party to an

,

action or proceeding for whom he was acting as attorney must, before any farther proceedings
are had against him be required by the adverse party, by written notice, to appoint another
attorney or to appear in person.
Rule 60. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record

(

and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any time
of its own initiative or on the motion of any party and after such notice, if any, as the court
orders. During the pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is
docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending may be so corrected
with leave of the appellate court.
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud, etc.
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a
\
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party or his legal representative from afinaljudgment, order, or proceeding for the following
reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under
Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation
or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been
satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or
otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective
application; or (6) any other reason justifying relieffromthe operation of the judgment. The
motion shall be made within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), or (3),not more than 3
months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this
Subdivision (b) does not affect thefinalityof a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does
not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a
judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure
for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an
independent action.
Rule 4-506, Utah Code of Judicial Administration
(1) Consistent with the Rules of Professional Conduct, an attorney may withdraw as
counsel of record except when (a) a motion has beenfiledand is pending before the court or (b) a
certificate of readiness for trial has been filed. Under these circumstances, an attorney may not
withdraw except upon motion and order of the court. When an attorney withdraws under
circumstances court approval is not required, the notice of withdrawal shall include a statement
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by the attorney that there are no motions pending and that no certificate or readiness of trial has
been filed.
(2) When an attorney withdraws as counsel of record, the withdrawing attorney must
serve written notice of the withdrawal upon the client of the withdrawing attorney and upon all
other parties not in default and a certificate of service must be filed with the court. If a trial date
has been set, the notice of withdrawal shall include a notification of the trial date.
(4) When an attorney dies or is removed or suspended or withdraws from the case or
ceases to act as an attorney, opposing counsel must notify the unrepresented client of his/her
responsibility to retain another attorney or to appear in person before opposing counsel can
initiate further proceedings against the client. A copy of the written notice shall be filed with the
court and no further proceedings shall be held in the case until 20 days have elapsed from the
date of filing.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A complaint for divorce was filed in this matter was filed on or about July 18,1995. The
parties have two young children (R. 2-3). During the marriage, plaintiff worked as a pharmicist
and defendant was a homemaker.
After extensive litigation, a notice of bench trial scheduled for Monday, June 23, 1997
was served upon the parties' counsel on May 21,1997 (R. 172). Defendant received no notice of
any hearing until the Friday before trial at approximately 4:50 p.m. (R. 228). At that time, her
counsel called and notified her that there was a hearing scheduled on the following Monday (R.
228-9). She was told that it was just a hearing and that she could appear by telephone (R. 229).
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On the morning of trial, the defendant's counsel sought leavefromthe court to withdraw
(R. 184). Leave was granted, the court struck the defendant's answer, her default was entered,
and plaintiff was awarded his attorneys fees and costs (R. 184, 398). Counsel for the plaintiff
then requested further relief not in requested in his complaint, which the court granted (R. 184,
398). No notice to appear or appoint counsel was filed. The notice of withdrawal of defendant's
counsel was filed until June 25,1997 (R. 185).
A final order was entered on July 7,1997 (R. 208). This order included further relief not
requested in plaintiffs complaint or at trial (R. 229-30).
Plaintiff filed her Rule 60(b) motion and supporting affidavit on September 18,1997.
Defendant filed his responsive objection to the motion on October 6,1997. It was unsupported
by affidavit or other documentation. No hearing was requested by either party. Defendant filed
his reply memorandum on October 14,1997 and submitted the matter for decision on October
23, 1998. The trial court denied by the motion by an order entered December 19, 1997 (R. 355).
Defendant filed a motion to reconsider on December 29,1997 (R. 358). An order denying the
motion to reconsider was entered January 21,1998 (R. 377).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Due to the actions or inaction of her former counsel, defendant was denied effective
notice of the trial in this matter. Her failure to appear at trial constitutes a mistake, surprise or
excusable neglect pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1), Utah R. Civ. P.
At trial, the defendant's former counsel sought and received the court's leave to withdraw
as counsel. Rule 4-506 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration provides that plaintiffs
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Amended Brief of Appellant
PageS
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

counsel was then required to file a notice to appear or appoint counsel and that no further
proceedings shall be held in the case until 20 days have elapsed from the filing of the notice.
Contrary to Rule 4-506, the court in this matter immediately struck the pleadings of the defendant
and granted additional relief to the plaintiff.
:^

ARGUMENT

L SURPRISE. MISTAKE OR EXCUSABLE NEGLECT
A. Defendant Had No Effective Notice of the Trial
Trial in this case was scheduled for June 23,1997. Defendant was not made aware that
there was a hearing scheduled in her case by her prior counsel until the Friday before trial at 4:50
p.m. (R. 228) He did not make her aware that it was the final trial in the matter and did not
informed her that she would not have to appear (R. 229). Mr. Dent consequently sought the
leave of the court to withdraw as counsel and filed a notice of withdrawal. The defendant's
answer was then stricken, her default entered, and the plaintiff was granted additional relief (R.
229-30,398). A default judgment was entered July 7, 1997.
On motion and upon such terms are just, the court may in the furtherance of justice
relieve a party from a final judgment for mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.
Rule 60, Utah Rules of Civile Procedure. Where any reasonable excuse is offered by the
defaulting party, courts generally favor grating relief from a default judgment, unless it appears
that to do so would result in substantial injustice to the adverse party. Westinghouse Elec.
Supply Co. v. Paul W. Larsen Contractor. 544 P.2d 876 (Utah 1975). The court in Mavhew v.
Standard Gilsonite Company. 376 P.2d 951 (Utah 1962) held that:
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It is undoubtedly correct that the trial court is endowed w itli considerable latitude of
discretion in granting or denying such motions. However, it is also true that the court
cannot act arbitrarily in that regard, but should be generally indulgent toward permitting
• M l inquiry and knowledge of disputes so they can be settled advisedly and in conformity
• with law and justice. To clamp a judgment rigidly and irrevocably on a party without a
hearing is obviously a harsh and oppressive thing. It is fundamental in our system of
justice that each party to a controversy should be afforded an opportunity to present his
side of the case. For that reason it is quite uniformly regarded as an abuse of discretion to
refuse to vacate a default judgment where there is reasonable justification or excuse for
the defendant's failure to appear, and timely application is made to set it aside.

to the neglect, mistake, or inadvertence of her counsel The fact 1 hat oc* did nor a p r e -r ^ j .
to surprise. The "harsh and oppressive" default j u d g m e n t issu.\: ^ u - Uia* • *..

^

i AI$ ringer

is cont rary to the pi irpose of R i lie 60(b)
The plaintiff, in his response to defendant's motion did not denv or controvert the facts as
given in defendant's memorane

.

:;

\ . _ ^i.;^.:-

n . .,:

... . : i - m e m o r a n d u m .

Rule 4-501(l)(B) o f the Code of judicial administration provides 'that "The responding party
shall file and serve u p o n all parties within ten days after service of a motion, a memorandum in

failed to provide any verified facts, the evidence presented bj the defendant was the • :»n ly
evidence before the trial court.
• It Is quite u niforml} regarded as an abuse of discretion to refuse to "\ acate a default
judgment where there is reasonable justiiication or excuse for the defendant's failure to appear,
and timely application is made to set it aside. Mayhew v. Standard Gilsonite Company. 376 P.2d
951 952(1962)
The negligence of attorneys are ground to remove default judgments under the rubric of
Loporto v. Hoegemann
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mistake, surprise or excusable neglect. £ee Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co.. 260 P.2d 741 (Utah
1953); Interstate Excavating. Inc. v. Agla Dev. Corp.. 611 P.2d 369 (Utah 1980); Helgesen v.
Invangumia. 636 P.2d 1079 OJtah 1981).
B. Rule 60(b> Motion was Timely and Defendant had Meritorious Defense
In order for defendant to be relieved from a default judgment, she must not only show
that the judgment was entered against her through any reason specified in Rule 60(b), but she
must also show that his motion to set aside the judgment was timely, and that she has a
meritorious defense to the action. State ex rel. Utah State Dep't of Social Servs. v. Musselman.
667 P.2d 1053 (Utah 1983). The courts, in the interest of justice and fair play, favor, where
possible, a full and complete opportunity for a hearing on the merits of every case. Heathman v.
Fabian. 377 P.2d 189 (Utah 1962). In the instant matter, defendant has filed her motion within
90 days of the judgment being entered and defendant alleges that several portions of the decree
would have been different had the issues been litigated (R. 229-30). Further, the plaintiff did
include relief in the decree which he did not request in his complaint (R. 229-30). This relief
would not have been available at trial. The defendant was awarded attorneys fees, without the
trial court having made findings regarding plaintiffs financial need, the defendant's ability to
pay, or the reasonableness of the fees as required by Larson v. Larson. 888 P.2d 719, 726 (Utah
App. 1994).
The defendant in her affidavit and motion asserts that a hearing on the merits of the case
would have resulted in a different outcome and that the decree entered by the court contains relief
which the plaintiff did not request in his complaint (R. 229-30). Usually, it is not appropriate to
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. lie merits of such claims. Erickson v. Shenkers Tnt'l Forwarders, Inc., 8^.

-

-*7

Clearly, under 'these circumstances, where 'the defendant was (1) not notified of the . •.--.-- •
hearing date until 4:50 p m. on the Friday before trial, (2) hex attorney told her that she did not ••.
have to appear, (3) her attorney did not tell her 'that it was the final 'trial in 'the matter but only
another hearing, and (4) her attorney told her that she could appear telephonically for whatever
hearing w as to take place, it w a s an abuse ol discretion lor lln li.nl eowit to ilenv ddciidanl
Rule 60(b) motion.' -

•-

' ''-"••" ' •

H NO NOTICE GIVEN TO DEFENDANT TO APPEAR OR APPQ1> i < i

*

A. Rule 4-506 Not Complied W ith • >. -. ->:^•-;.:-:
As was held in Sperrv v. Smith, and 694 P 2 J '81 (Utah 1984) and Interstate Excavating.

unrepresented party must be given notice to appear or appoini: counsel before further proceedings
are held. Rule 4-506 of the Code of Judicial Administration requires that• When an attorney dies or is removed or suspended or withdraws iron* ;nc ^a^ *,r -~a. _
to act as an attorney, opposing counsel must notify, in writing, the unrepresented client of
••• his/her responsibility to retain another attorney or appear in person before opposing
counsel can initiate further proceedings against 'the client, A copy of the written notice
shall be filed with the court, and no further proceeding shall be held in the matter until 20
days have elapsed from the date q /'* filing [emphasis added]
This procedure was clearly not complied with in the instant matter. After the court: allowed Mr,

sentence of 4-506(3) imposes a burden upon Mr. Christensen, which he did not fulfill The
second sentence imposes a burden upon the court that nor further proceedings be held until Mr.
ioporto v. Hoegemann
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Christensen does his duty. Here, after Mr. Dent withdrew, Mr. Christensen did not file the
appropriate notice. Further, the court took action against the defendant before the proper notice
was filed. The rule is clear that not further proceeding may be held until 20 days after filing of
the notice. The rule grants no discretion to the trial court to ignore or waive its provisions.
This case is similar to Sperrv v. Smith. 694 P.2d 581 (Utah 1984). There, the defendants
retained an attorney to represent them. He later notified them of a hearing for summary judgment
but and withdrew as their counsel. The attorney filed and served a notice of withdrawal on
plaintiffs counsel. At the summary judgment hearing, the defendants did not appear and
summary judgment was granted. The defendants then re-retained the same attorney and he filed
a Rule 60(b) motion based upon subsections 60(b)(3) ("misconduct of an adverse party") and (6)
("any other reason justifying relief from operation of the judgment"). The defendants
complained that plaintiffs counsel had failed follow the predecessor to Rule 4-506. Specifically,
plaintiffs counsel had failed to provide a notice to appear or appoint counsel before further
proceedings were had against the defendants.
In Sperry. the plaintiff claimed that the district court had the right to waive compliance
with the predecessor to Rule 4-506, Rule 2.5 of the Rules of Practice of the District Court of the
State of Utah. The Utah Supreme Court did not necessarily fault the plaintiffs counsel for
failing to comply with procedural requirements, as he did not receive a copy of the notice of
withdrawal. However, the trial judge was aware of the withdrawal. The Supreme Court held
that:
[T]he trial judge should have required plaintiffs attorney to then give notice to [the
defendants] in accordance with Rule 2.5 before proceeding to hear and grant the motion
for summary judgment. Since the judgment was entered after the failure of the court to
Loporto v. Hoegemann
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o w one of its own rules, we conclude that the trial court abused it discretion in
:sing to set aside the summary judgment when the error was brought to its attention.
_ ;rry. 694 P.2d at 583. The situation in Sperry was the very situation which Rule 4-506 was
designed to address. J ustice Howe, joined mi lus opinion \y\ ( hid" Justk c 1 Lill, and Jusiitc .
Stewart, Durham and Zimmerman, held that 'the defendants "should not be deprived of 'the
salutory protection of the rule." The summary judgment was vacated,
ID

this, CUM1 Ihc ijefcndanl al'io ri'uM ril notice ul i In1 HUIL* hut .hi1 \\i\-\ folul Jnc ilnl mil

need to appear and was not told the nature of the hearing. The defendants in Sperry were notified
of these facts. I he defendants in Sperry had some advanced notice of their attorneys wii:;^, . - a
and the defendant here did not. Counsel for the plaintiff in Sperry had no actual notice of the
withdrawal of opposing counsel, but Mr. Christensen was standing in the court room in this case.

or appoint being tiled and served Soerry is a less egregious abuse of discretion than **v 5 -: uii
matter, hi oiai cdi>c, me delcnuantb and piamtifFs counsel had greater knowledge of the situation
than here.
In Interstate Excavating. Inc. v. Agla Development Corp. £\* P 2d 369 (Utah 1980:, -he

defendant's attorney .and a notice to appear or appoint filed b> plaintiffs counsel. The defendant
denied receiving either nou^

^ ..u: . ^ a ^ u i u did not appear at trial, a default was entered

than the denial *•'• the motion. After reciting that courts are generally indulgent toward the setting
aside of default judgments and whs^ mciv ^ u<^

- «. ..ang it aside, the doubt should be
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resolved in favor of doing so," the court concluded that the interests of justice would be served
by setting aside the default and allowing the parties to present their side of the controversy. The
default judgment was vacated. In this matter, the defendant maintains that she had no knowledge
that the trial was to be held on June 23,1997 and had been told by her counsel that she did not
need to appear (R. 229). No contrary evidence was presented prior to the matter being submitted
for decision. There was evidence before the court in Interstate Excavating that the defendants had
been sent the notice of withdrawal and notice to appear or appoint prior to the default having
been entered. Here, it is clear that the defendant was not mailed the notice of withdrawal until
after the default was entered and that Mr. Christensen, plaintiffs counsel, never served a notice
i

to appear or appoint. As was the case in Sperry. the Interstate Excavating case is a much less
agregious abuse of discretion than the instant matter.
Trial courts are given no discretion to ignore the provisions of Rule 4-506. In Hartford

(

Leasing Corp. v. State. 888 P.2d 694 (Utah App. 1994), the trial court excused the State for
failing to provide a notice to appear or appoint The court held that 'the rule's provisions,
i

however, offer no room for such discretion to excuse noncompliance: 'opposing counsel must...
before opposing counsel can initiate further proceedings."' [citation omitted]. Hartford Leasing
Corp. 888 P.2d at 700. The prohibition against any further proceedings being held is likewise

<

mandatory: "no further proceedings shall be held ..." [emphasis added] Utah Code of Judicial
Administration, Rule 4-506(3).
B. Section 78-51-36 Not Complied With
Further, a notice to appear or appoint is required by statute. Section 78-51-36 of the Utah
Code provides that:

1
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When an attorney dies or is removed or suspended, or ceases to act as such, a party to an
action or proceeding for whom, he was acting as attorney must, before any further
proceedings are had against him be required by the adverse party, by written notice, to
appoint another attorney or to appear in person.
Mr. Dent's withdrawal of counsel on the morning of trial is the same as if the he died or been
suspended. He ceased to act and Ms, Hoegemann's attorney without providing the reasonable

required by statute was not followed, and the defendant was not given proper notice to appear or
appoint counsel before further proceedings were initiated against her.
CONCLUSION
The evidence before the court was that the defendant was contacted by her attorney on the

the attorney did not notify her that it was the final trial He told her that she did not have to
appear. At trial, he withdrew as counsel with the leave of the court and without providing any

additional relief to the plaintiff. The defendant's failure to appear is clearly due to surprise,
mistake and the neglect of her counsel under Rule 60(b)(,

... luUu^ ui \ii. i. uiistensen fo

file a notice of appearance of counsel is a violation of Rule u *v

», ds ins iaku;^ *\-r*-

against the plaintiff was a violation, of his responsibilities uhder .<ule 4-506 Final • \ :ne , • -w;; *
entering of the ileiatili alia tin: w itlidmwal nf detendjnl s UHIIIM.'I .ind llie yianLiiy ui iurLhtT
relief was a violation of Rule 4-506(3), which provides "that "no 'further proceedings shall be held
in the case until 20 days have elapsed from filing of the date -f filing " This entitles the
defendant to relief under R i lie 60(b)(6) As discussed .-

M,C;.;

and Intersmic nxcavating
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the rules were followed to a much greater degree and the defendants were in a much better
position than here. As stated in Mayhew v. Standard Gilsonite Company. 376 P.2d 951 (Utah
1962):
To clamp a judgment rigidly and irrevocably on a party without a hearing is obviously a
harsh and oppressive thing. It is fundamental in our system of justice that each party to a
controversy should be afforded an opportunity to present his side of the case. For that
reason it is quite uniformly regarded as an abuse of discretion to refuse to vacate a default
judgment where there is reasonable justification or excuse for the defendant's failure to
appear, and timely application is made to set it aside.
In both Sperry and Interstate Excavating, where less egregious abuses of discretion occurred than
the instant matter, the appellate court vacated the judgments which resulted from the defendants'
failure to appear. That relief should be granted to defendant here and the she should be afforded
an opportunity to present her side of the case.
Dated this 17th day of August, 1998.

Samuel G. Draper, for
Hughes & Read

<

\
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I, Samuel G. Draper, certify that on August 17,1998,1 served two copies of the attached
Brief of Appellant upon R. Clay Huntsman, the counsel for the AppUee in this matter, by mailing
it to him by first class mail with sufficient postage prepaid to the following address:
R. Clay Huntsman
Paul R. Christensen
HUNTSMAN & CHRISTENSEN
283 West Hilton Drive, Ste. 3
St. George, UT 84770
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ADDENDUM
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FIFTH DISTRICT COURT-ST GEORGE COURT
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JOHN A LOPORTO,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
BENCH TRIAL

vs .

C a s e N o : 9 5 4 5 0 0 4 2 4 DA

LUCY Z LOPORTO,
Defendant.

Judge:
Date:

JAMES L .
June 23,

SHUMJ
1397

PRESENT
Plaintiff(s): JOHN A LOPORTO
Plaintiff's Attorney (s) : PAUL R CHRISTENSEN
Defendant's Attorney (s) : HAROLD J DENT
Video
Tape Number:
970234
Tape Count: 9:05
Clerk:
gwynm

TRIAL
TAPE 970234
TIME 9 :GS
On reoord
At the time of the trial a record is made in reference to
Mr. Dent withdrawing from the case. Pleadings are m o o t .
Mr. Christensen's motion for default, attorney fees and
waiver of defendant's entitlement to the retirment fund.
Motion is granted and counsel is to oreoare the order.
TIMS 9:08
Off record
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON, STATE OF UTAH
HON. JAMES L. SHUMATE, judge

JOHN A. LOPORTO,

)

Plaintiff,

)

vs.
LUCY Z.

)

(LOPORTO) HOEGEMANN,

Civil No. 954500424

)

(Videotaped Proceedings)
Defendant.

)

REPORTER'S HEARING TRANSCRIPT
Monday, June 23, 1997
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL:
For the Plaintiff:

HUNTSMAN & CHRISTENS EN
BY: PAUL R. CHRISTENSEN, ESQ.
283 West Hilton Drive, Suite 3
St. George, Utah 84770

For the Defendant:

SCARTH & DENT
BY: HAROLD J. DENT, ESQ.
150 North 200 East, Suite 203
St. George, Utah 8 477 0

PAUL G. MCMULLIN
CERTIFiED SHORTHAND REPORTER
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
Reuben153-1
Clark Law School, BYU.
P.O.J. BOX
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ST. GEORGE. UTAH

S-"i

(

ST, GEORGE, UTAH; MONDAY, JUNE 23, 1S97
-cCc-

THE COURT:

Good morning, Ladies and Gentlemen.

The record will reflect that today is the 2 3rd day of June,
19S7, and the hour is 9:03 A.M.
Two matters are on the calendar for a hearing on
this morning's date.
Loporto.

The first one is Loporto versus

The file number there is 954500424.
Mr. Lcpcrto is present.

His counsel,

Mr. Christensen, is also present.
Counsel, I am informed by Mr. Dent, through the
clerk's office, that he does not have his client here,
intends to ask leave of the Court to withdraw, and based
upon that, would basically leave this matter in a position
of entering a default.
Is that your understanding as well?
MR. CHRISTENSEN:

That's my understanding,

Your Honor.
THE COURT:

Here comes Mr. Dent right now, so

I'll stop talking for him and let him say it himself.
Mr. Dent, I just put on the record the
information that was conveyed to me in Loporto that
indicated that your client was not here.

That you had

difficulty, apparently, in your relationship with the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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client and had asked leave to withdraw in Lcpcrto.
Is that correct, Counsel?
MR. DENT:
THE COURT:
is granted.

That's correct, Your Honor.
All right.

Your motion to withdraw

The pleadings of the defendant are ordered

stricken.
Mr. Christensen, you may take your relief
sought, and you may take attorney's fees as well.
MR. CHRISTENSEN:
concern is —

Thank you, Your Honor.

My one

is that there's a retirement fund in this

particular matter.

And under the Woodward v. Woodward, the

defendant would be entitled to one half of that.

However,

based upon the facts that we haven't received child support
or any of the other costs such as medical care or child
care, we would be seeking for having her waive any
entitlement to that retirement.
THE COURT:

Counsel, the Court, in view of this

defendant's recalcitrance in prosecuting this litigation,
the difficult times that this file shows that have gone on
through this manner, I think the equities in the case
firmly support the award of the entire retirement fund.
MR. CHRISTENSEN:
THE COURT:

Thank you, Your Honor.

So you may draft your pleadings

accordingly, and I'll sign them.
MR. CHRISTENSEN:

Thank you, Your Honor.
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THE COURT:

Thank you, counsel.

MR. DENT:

Thank you, Your Honor.

(Whereupon, the matter was concluded.)
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C E R T I F I C A T E
STATE OF UTAH

)
) ss.
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON )

I, PAUL G. MCMULLIN, CSR, RPR, a Certified
Shorthand Reporter and Notary Public duly qualified in and
for the State of Utah, do hereby certify:
That the foregoing matter, to wit, JOHN A.
LOPORTO VS- LUCY 2.

(LOPORTO) HOEGEHANN, CIVIL NO.

954500424, was videotaped at the time and place therein
named and thereafter, to the best of my listening and
understanding, reduced to computerized transcription.
I further testify that I am not interested in
the event of the action.
WITNESS my hand and seal this 2nd day of
December, 1997.

PiftJL G. 'i&ZMULLIN, CSR, RPR

RESIDING AT: St. George, Utah
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES: 3-17-99 ,•
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AFFIDAVIT OF LUCY "OEGEMANN

CC R
' " "'
J? SE? 18 PFJ 4 18

CONFORMED
COPY

W;.:H.N

„.••:•, C O U N T Y

M V

SAMUEL G. DRAPER (Bar Nc. 7050)
HUGHES & READ
A t t o r n e y s f o r Defendant
187 Ncrzh 100 West
S t . George, Utah
84770
Telephone:
(801) 673-4392
Fax:"
(801) 673-2774
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY
STATS OF UTAH
JOHN A. LOPCRTC,
AFFIDAVIT LUCY ECEGSMANN
Plaintiff,
v.
LUCY Z. (LOFORTO) KOEGEMANN,
Case No. 9545QC424
Judge James L. Shumate

Defendant.

. ^ — — — — — — — — - ^ ^ _ ^ ^ _ _ _ — — ^ _

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OE WASHINGTON

)
:
)

ss.

Defendant LUCY HCEGEMAMN, being first duly sworn, stages and
alleges as follows, to-wit:
1.

(

. . . . ' _ ; " _

I am an adult resident of Clark County, State of Nevada, and a.?.
fully competent as to the matters set forth herein, and do so
based upon my own personal knowledge.

2.

The trial in this case was scheduled for Monday, June 23, 1997.

3.

I was represented by Jay Dent.

4.

He did not notify me of the hearing date until the Friday prior
to trial at 4 :50 p.m.
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my paperwork was lost.

This was the reason that I was net:

notified sooner.
I reside in Las Vegas and had committed to work on the following
Monday.
At the time I was notified of the hearing date, there was no one
I could have requested the day off from around.
Mr. Dent called me on Sunday night at my home, and told me that
he would contact me on Monday from the courtroom, and that at
that I could appear by telephone.
At no time did he tell me it was for the final trial in this
matter; he told me it was just a hearing.
He said that he was going to tell the judge that the parties were
close to settlement and there were just a few issues to work out.
Consequently, I did not appear at the hearing.

Indeed, I was the

only person working at my office on Monday and could not have
taken the day off on such short notice.
After the date of the hearing, I received a notice of withdrawal
of counsel from Mr. Dent and a Notice of Entry of the decree.
I relied on my attorneys assertion that I did not have to appear
for the hearing scheduled for hearing.
In the event my case had proceeded to trial and I had been
present, I believe that the decree would have been different in
relation to child support, property division, and visitation.
Snmp

nf
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my premarital property, and should have been awarded to me.
16,

Some of my personal items which had been awarded to me in prior
court orders were also awarded to the plaintiff.

17

The income numbers in the child support calculation in the decree
are incorrect, as is my place of employment and occupation.

13

The restrictions placed on my visitation are unreasonable and
would not have been ordered by the court should the case have
been tried.

19

I believe that it is in the best interests of the children that
these issues be tried by the court.

20

The allocation of attorneys fees is also unfounded in law or
equity and this issue should be tried by the court.

21

The allocation of Jerry Thamert's costs to me is also
unreasonable and unfounded.
FURTHER TKY AFFIANT SAYETH NOT.
DATED THIS

Q

day of September, 1997.

On the 6
day of September, 1997, personally appeared
before me LUCY KOEGEMANN, the signer of the foregoing af f ic^rv^t,
duly acknowledged to me that she executed the same

771

JOTARY PUBLIC
Residing at:
Notary Pu!..•TATE OF U"
My commission expires:
••••shingtcnDigitized
COL;" by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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CSRTIFICAT5 OF MAILING I hereby certify that a full, true and correct copy of the above
and foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF LUCY H0EG2MANN was placed in the United
States mail at St. Gecrcre, Utah, with first-class pcstaae thereon
fully prepaid, en the

I*

day of September, 1997, addressed as

fellows:
John A. Locorto
223 South 2100 East
Su. George, UT 84770
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Paul R. Christensen USB No. 5677
HUNTSMAN & CHRISTENSEN
Attorney for Plaintiff
.283 West Hilton Drive, Ste. 3
St- George, Utah 8 4 770
Telephone:
(435) 623-2846
Facsimile:
(435) 623-3049
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAi

JOHN A. LOPORTO,

ORDER

Flaintiff,
vs.
lase No. 9 54 5004 2 4
LUCY Z. (LOPORTO) KCEGEMANN,
Defendant.

Judcre James L. Shumate

This matter came on regularly for hearing before the aboveentitled Court en Thursday, December 4, 1997 en Defendant's Metier.
to

Strike

Hearing

scheduled

for December

5,

1997.

Plaintiff

appeared personally, and was represented bv Paul P.. Christensen of
the law firm of HUNTSMAN £ CHRISTENSEN.

Defendant did not appear,

but was represented by Samuel G. Draper of the law firm cf HUGHES
& READ.

The Court made a record that the Motions and Memoranda cf

the parties had been read.
of both parties.

The Court heard argument from counsel

No witnesses were called.

NOW THEREFORE IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that:
1
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The hearing heretofore set for December 3

1007

a - t-

hour

of 2:00 p.m. en Defendant's Motion for Relief from Dec:
JS

stricken.

is

•-. - -

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that:
Defendant's Motion for Relief from Decree is
ceniec
V2 .
Dated this
/ -XJT
cay cf
\v

TLTT

-:E COURT,

DISTR I C T c-Su
Approved as to Form

. ^ . , v , ,,j(s

/ H i

Sar.uei G. Draoer
^GEZS & READ*
.Attorneys f o r Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE EY MAILING
I do hereby certify that on the
~~
dav of i
1997, I mailed a true and correct unsigned copy of the above and
foregoing ORDER by placing same in the United States Mail, firstclass postage prepaid, to the following to wit:
Samuel G. Draper
HUGHES St READ
Attorney at Law
13 7 North 10 0 West
St. George, Utah 84770

.- -.

Secretarv
CERTIFICATE CF SERVICE 5Y MAILING
-J,*. r\ b.
dav cf X St <' ->- h.
I dc herebv certifv that on the
1997, I mailed a true and correct sicned copy of the above' and
foregoing ORDER by placing same in the United States Mail, firstclass postage prepaid, to the following to wit:
Samuel G. Draper
HUGHES & READ
Attorney for Defendant
137 North 100 West
St. George, Utah 3 477 0
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SAMUEL G, DRAPER (Bar No. 7050)
HUGHES & READ
Attorneys for Defendant
187 North 100 West
St. George, Utah
84770
Telephone: (435) 673-4892

oy_

1H _

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JOHN A. LOPORTO,

ORDER

Plaintiff,
v.
LUCY Z. (LOPORTO) HOEGEMANN,

Case No.: 954500424
Judge : Jarr.esL. Shumate

Defendant.

Defendant, by and through her attorney, Samuel G. Draper,
having motioned the court to reconsider it's Order entered December
19, 1997, and Plaintiff, by and through his attorney, Paul Christensen
having filed an Objection and Memorandum in opposition thereto, and
the matter having been submitted for decision.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AS FOLLOWS:
• Defendant's Motion to Reconsider is hereby granted,
and defendant is relieved from the July 7,1997 decree.
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Defendant's Motion to Reconsider i s d e n i e d .
DATED this

day of January, 1998

BY THE COURT

-ESPIES L. SHUMATE
District Court Judce
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CS3TISTCAT5 OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a full, true and correct copy of the
above and foregoing ORDES., was placed in the United States mail at St
George, Utah, with first-class postage thereon fully prepaid, on the
1^3^ day of January, 1998, addressed as follows:
Paul R. Christensen
HUNTSMAN & CHRISTENSEN
283 West Hilton Drive, Suite 3
St. George, UT 84770
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